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Abstract
We study decentralized markets with the presence of middlemen, modeled by a
non-cooperative bargaining game in trading networks. Our goal is to investigate how
the network structure of the market and the role of middlemen influence the market’s
efficiency and fairness. We introduce the concept of limit stationary equilibrium in a
general trading network and use it to analyze how competition among middlemen is
influenced by the network structure, how endogenous delay emerges in trade and how
surplus is shared between producers and consumers.
1 Introduction
In most markets trade does not involve just producers and consumers but also one or more
middlemen serving as intermediaries. For example, brokers and market makers fill this
role in financial markets as do wholesalers and retailers in many manufacturing industries.
Classical economic approaches to studying markets, such as competitive equilibrium analysis,
largely abstract away the role of such middlemen; a point made in the introduction of
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), who attribute this is to a lack of modeling how trade occurs
and the associated frictions involved. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) offer a solution to
this shortcoming by adopting a search theoretic model as in Diamond and Maskin (1979),
Mortensen (1982), Diamond (1982). Agents meet pairwise over time and must wait until
they meet a suitable partner to trade. The time it takes to find a partner is costly thus
introducing a search friction. The role of middlemen is in reducing this friction. Subsequently
there has been much work in studying different models of trade (e.g., various non-cooperative
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bargaining models) and using these to analyze how middlemen influence the formation of
prices and the efficiency of trade.
Much of the aforementioned work has focused on models in which all producers and
consumers have access to the same middlemen. However, often this is not the case due,
for example, to various institutional or physical barriers. One example of this as pointed
out by Blume et al. (2009) is in agricultural supply chains of developing countries. In such
cases, due to inadequate transportation infrastructure, farmers may only be able to trade in
local markets. Such relationships are naturally modeled via a network. Blume et al. (2009)
consider such trading networks with a focus on characterizing how network structure effects
equilibrium prices set by middlemen which have full information and full bargaining power
and so there are no trading frictions. Similar equilibrium questions have also been studied
in the supply chain literature (e.g. Nagurney et al. (2002)).
The first line of work described above focuses on modeling trade and its associated
frictions, assuming simple trading networks (often with a single middleman). On the other
hand, the second line of work focuses on the impact of network structure but does not
account for trade frictions. The interaction of both these effects is not well understood. In
a more complex network, the search problem facing an agent will depend on her location in
the network, and the presence of such frictions will naturally given rise to different equilibria
than in models such as Blume et al. (2009).
This paper provides a starting point to bridge this gap: as in Blume et al. (2009) we
consider a trading network connecting consumers to producers, but as in Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1987), agents randomly meet over time and engage in non-cooperative bargaining
protocols. Thus, our paper provides a general framework that incorporates three important
features of markets. First is the underlying network structure: not all pairs of agents can
interact in the market. The second is the non-cooperative bargaining setting: no agents have
the power to set prices, the prices are formed through a negotiation process. Finally, the
third is the search cost: agents discount their payoff if they do not find a proper trading
partner or fail to negotiate. The possibility of not finding a proper trading partner is an
important additional search cost in our model.
It is well known that such complex models are often intractable. However, by considering
large markets and adopting a mean-field approach, we show that this type of model becomes
tractable and exhibits many interesting properties. In particular, following Nguyen (2012),
we consider a non-cooperative bargaining game in a finite network, and study the agents’
behavior in the limit as the population at each node of the network increases. We introduce
a notion of a limit stationary equilibrium, and show that it always exists. We then use this
concept to investigate the efficiency of the market, how bargaining with middlemen cause
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endogenous delay in equilibrium, and how network structure influences competition among
middlemen and the share of surplus between producers and consumers. To illustrate these
new insights, next we describe three properties exhibited at equilibrium in our model that
are qualitatively different from the predictions in the existing literature.
Competition among middlemen
Figure 1: An example trading network with producers (1,2); consumers (5,6) and middlemen
(3,4).
First, to illustrate how network structure influences the competition among middlemen,
consider the trading network shown in Figure 1. For simplicity, we assume each producer
produces a unit of an indivisible good, and each consumer desires one item and obtains a
value normalized to 1 dollar upon consuming it. The links in the network represent which
pairs of agents can trade and are assumed to be directional links going from left to right. In
our model, only pairs of agents that are connected can meet and bargain. Unlike a static
model like Blume et al. (2009), we assume1 agents meet and trade over a infinite, discrete
time horizon, where each agent discounts their payoffs by a factor 0 < δ < 1.
In static models without search frictions like Blume et al. (2009), the middleman have all
the bargaining power and they simultaneously suggest prices to the producers and consumers
for trade to occur. The producers and consumers then use these prices to determine the
middlemen they would like to use for the trade. The middlemen never hold the good,
and so need not consider the consequences of any future competition between each other.
Such models predict that the “bargaining power” of middlemen at nodes 3 and 4 in this
network should be the same, because the roles of agents at these nodes can be interchanged
if we change the role of producers and consumers. In our model, because of search friction,
middlemen do not meet both producers and consumers at the same time and so cannot
1A precise description, with a more general model, is given in Section 2.
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simultaneously propose prices to each of them. Only after buying a good from producers, can
the middlemen resell it to consumers. Assuming this type of market structure significantly
changes the outcome. In the network in Figure 1, for example, our results show that there
is no symmetry between nodes 3 and 4. In particular, the bargaining power of middlemen
at node 3 is higher than that of a middlemen at node 4. Middleman 3 has a competitive
advantage on the consumer side: it has access to more consumers than middleman 4. Thus,
when holding a good, middlemen 3 can find a consumer in an easier and faster manner
than 4. This has an important effect for trade in previous rounds between producers and
middlemen. Here, even though 4 has access to more producers (1 and 2), after buying the
good from these producers, middleman 4 is aware that he needs to compete and cannot get
as high a surplus as middleman 3, resulting in him not being able to offer good prices to
producers 1 and 2. In other words, competition on the consumers’ side has an influence back
along the trading network to the competition on the producers’ side, and this disadvantages
middleman 4. See Theorem 4.1 for a precise statement.
Endogenous Delay
Figure 2: A network exhibiting endogenous delay.
The second distinguishing property of our model is endogenous delay in trade due to the
sunk cost problem. Consider the network shown in Figure 2. The producer has to trade with
one middleman in order for the good to reach the consumer. Assume that the consumer has
a value of V units for consuming the good, and trade on the two links incurs transaction
costs of a and b units, respectively.
In an efficient market, if V > a + b, so that trade is beneficial, producers would trade
with middlemen and middlemen would trade with consumers whenever these agents meet
one another. However, in our model, after buying a good from the producer, middlemen
needs to bargain with a consumer to resell the good. At this point, the transaction cost a is
sunk and is irrelevant in the negotiation. Wong and Wright (2011) consider a model for such
a setting, where each node represents a single agent. In such a model, the expected payoff
of the middlemen from the re-sale might not be enough to recover the sunk cost, leading
to market failure2. In our model each node consists of a large population of agents and the
2Mathematically, this happens when V < (1 +α)a+ b for a positive α that depends on other parameters
of the model.
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“bargaining power” of a middleman agent at location 2 compared with a consumer agent at
location 3 depends on the competition with other middlemen that are also trying to sell3.
In particular, if the fraction of middlemen that are selling is small, then when negotiating
with consumers, they obtain a higher payoff, which will overcome the sunk cost problem of
trading with 1. However, to maintain the small fraction of middlemen looking to sell, the
rate of trades between 1 and 2 needs to be smaller than the rate between 2 and 3. This
then implies that when producers and middlemen meet, they do not trade with probability
1. This can only be rationalized if the surplus of trade is the same as the producers’ outside
option, which we normalize to be 0. In other words, in this case the producers are indifferent
between trading and not trading. When two agents meet, even though they can potentially
trade, if they only enact a successful negotiation with a probability p ∈ (0, 1), we interpret
this as endogenous delay. This result is formally stated in Theorem 5.2 in Section 5.2.
Contrast with Double Marginalization
Lastly, we contrast the outcome of our model with the classical theory of double marginal-
ization, see for example Lerner (1934) and Tirole (1988). Double marginalization appears
in a similar market structure like ours, where producers sell the good to middlemen and
middlemen continue to sell to the consumers downstream. The market protocols in these
environments, however are different from our model. Namely, in the double marginalization
literature, it is assumed that when selling the good producers and middlemen have total
market power, and charge a monopoly price to their downstream market. As a consequence,
middlemen earn a non-negligible profit, consumers pay higher prices and producers have
lower profits.
On the other hand, here we assume no agents have a monopoly market power. The prices
are formed through a negotiation process. Furthermore, we assume middlemen are long lived,
while producers and consumers exit the game after trading4. This captures the contrast
between different type of agents: middlemen often stay in the market for a long period,
while producers and consumers have limited supply and demand for a certain good and do
not participate in the market after getting rid of the supply or having satisfied the demand.
This assumption captures many realistic markets among small producers and consumers,
who are faced with search problems and need to trade through middlemen; examples of such
markets include the following: agricultural markets with farmers, consumers and grocery
3In our model, we assume each middlemen can hold at most one item at a time, thus middlemen that are
holding an item need to sell before buying again.
4The assumption of long-lived middlemen and short-lived producers and consumers is also made in Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky (1987) and Wong and Wright (2011).
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stores; e-commerce markets with sellers, buyers and entities like Ebay or Amazon; and
financial markets involving investors, borrowers and banks.
We will show that these assumptions have a fundamental impact on the price formation
in the economy. In particular, as the discount rate goes to 1, so that it does not cost
agents to wait, the total equilibrium payoff of producers and consumer approaches the total
value of trade. What this means is that as agents are more patient, middlemen earn a
negligible fee per transaction. The intuition is that in our model, we assume middlemen stay
in the game forever, but do not consume. They instead earn money by flipping the good.
Thus, middlemen have an incentive to buy and sell the good relatively fast. On the other
hand as the discount rate goes to 1, producers and consumer can engage in costless search
and bargaining. This brings down the intermediary fee, and helps the market work more
efficiently5. Theorem 5.1 states this finding rigorously.
Naturally, when the discount rate is not close to 1, then the above property does not hold.
More generally, how the agents share the trade surplus depends on a complex combination
of the network structure and the discount rate. We will rigorously study this question in the
rest of our paper.
1.1 Related Work
As discussed previously, one line of work that this paper draws upon originates from Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky (1987) who give a model for search frictions in decentralized trade
involving middlemen. The setting in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) can be viewed in terms
of our model as a simple three node network, with the nodes corresponding to producers,
consumers and middelmen, respectively; trade may occur either directly between a producer
and consumer or via a middlemen. As in our model, the market evolves in a sequence of
periods, where in each period agents are matched and discount future profits. However, in-
stead of considering a strategic bargaining model as we do, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987)
consider a model in which if trade is profitable, it occurs with the net surplus being split
between the agents. The equilibrium of this market is studied under a steady-state assump-
tion. This is similar to the limit-stationary equilibrium that we consider, except here we
show that such a stationary equilibrium emerges naturally in a limiting sense.
The articles Wong and Wright (2011) and Nguyen (2012) extend this type of model to
line networks, i.e. networks consisting of a sequence of nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm in which trade
occurs only between nodes vn and vn+1, for n = 1, . . . ,m − 1 (here, v1 is a producer, vm
a consumer and the remaining nodes are middlemen). Wong and Wright (2011) consider a
5This however does not imply that the total aggregate payoff of middlemen approaches 0. Their limit
payoff is
∑∞
k=1 δ
k · fee can be positive as δ approaches 1 and fee approaches 0.
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more extensive bargaining model and study both a model with one agent per node and a
model with many agents per node, under a steady-state assumption similar to Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1987). Nguyen (2012) considers a similar bargaining model as in this paper
but does not model search friction in the same way. Specifically, in Nguyen (2012) the
matching process proceeds by first selecting one agent to be a proposer. The proposer is
then always able to find a feasible trading partner if one exists (i.e. if the proposer has a
good, it is able to find either a consumer or middleman without the good to trade with). In
contrast, in the matching model considered here, a proposing agent may be matched with
another agent with whom trade is infeasible, even if a feasible trading partner exists. This
increases the search costs and has important consequences. Namely, in Nguyen (2012), it
is shown that a limit stationary equilibrium might not exist, while here we show that one
always does.
The Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) paper and the aforementioned references focus on
the role of middlemen in reducing search frictions (see also Yavas¸ (1994)). Other works have
considered a middleman’s role in mitigating information frictions, including Biglaiser (1993),
Li (1998); such considerations are not addressed here.
Other related models of decentralized trade in networks include Manea (2011), which con-
siders distributed bargaining in a network consisting of only producers and consumers as well
as earlier work including Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Binmore and Herrero (1988), Gale
(1987), which consider decentralized bargaining between producer and consumers, where any
consumer can potentially trade with any producer without involving any middlemen.
The other line of work this paper draws on is work such as Blume et al. (2009) that
focuses on general trading networks and seeks to understand how network structure impacts
the division of the gains from trade. As in this paper, Blume et al. (2009) consider general
networks with the restriction that all trade must go through a middleman and middlemen
do not trade with each other. Here, we also do not consider networks in which middlemen
trade with each other, but we do allow for trade routes that do not involve any middlemen.
As noted previously, in Blume et al. (2009) middlemen can simultaneously announce prices
to buyers and sellers. The full information Nash equilibrium of the resulting pricing game
is characterized. Somewhat related equilibria questions have been studied in the context of
supply chains (see e.g. Nagurney et al. (2002)), where in this case, producers are able to
produce and ship multiple units of a product to middlemen and consumers.
On the technical side, our solution concept of limit stationary equilibria is closely related
to work on mean field equilibrium6 for dynamic games (see e.g. Graham and Me´le´ard (1994),
6In this line of work, the convergence of finite-player games to mean-field equilibria is rigorously analyzed
so that any spurious mean-field equilibria can be rejected. See Gomes et al. (2010), Adlakha et al. (2010),
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Lasry and Lions (2007), Gue´ant et al. (2011), Benaim and Boudec (2011)). As in our analysis,
the theme in this work is characterizing a notion of equilibria for a “large market,” in which
users make decisions based on a steady-state view of the market, where this steady-state view
is asymptotically consistent with the user’s actions. In most of the mean field literature, all
users are statistically identical, while in our model each user has a fixed type depending on
his location in the trading network. This notion is similar to work in Huang et al. (2010),
which considers a mean field limit for the control for linear quadratic Gaussian systems where
the interaction between users depends on their “locality.”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline non-
cooperative bargaining model. Section 3 discusses the solution concept of limit stationary
equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 uses this equilibrium to provide comparative analysis of several
networks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we introduce the model that we will use. We start by defining the concept of
a trading network.
Trading Network:
We consider a group of producers, consumers and middlemen interconnected by an under-
lying trading network, which is modeled as a directed graph, G = (V , E) (see Figure 3).
Each node i ∈ V represents a population of Ni agents, all of which are either consumers,
producers or middlemen. Hence, we can partition the set of vertices into the following three
disjoint sets: a set of producers denoted by P , a set of middlemen denoted by M, and a
set of consumers denoted by C. An agent from the population at a node i will sometime
be referred to as a type i agent. Trade occurs over directed edges, i.e., a directed edge
(i, j) ∈ E indicates that a type i agent can potentially directly trade with any type j agent
with the good going from i to j as a result of the trade. With a slight abuse of terminology,
we often refer to two such agents as being connected by the edge (i, j). For a consumer to
acquire a good from a producer, there must be a (directed) path from the consumer to the
producer. If this path has length 1, then the two can directly trade, otherwise they must
rely on middlemen to facilitate the trade. For simplicity, we consider networks in which any
path between a consumer and producer contains at most one middleman, i.e all such paths
are either length 1 or 2. An example of such a network is shown in Figure 3. With this
for example.
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assumption, the set of directed edges, E can also be partitioned into three disjoint sets: those
that directly connect producers to consumers (denoted by E1), those that connect producers
to middlemen (denoted by E2), and those that connect middlemen to consumers (denoted
by E3).
Figure 3: A network among producers, consumers and middlemen.
We assume that there is one type of indivisible good in this economy7. All producers
produce identical goods and all consumers want to acquire these goods. The value that each
consumer of type c ∈ C gets from an item is Vc ≥ 0. In every period each agent can hold at
most one unit of the good (an item)8. Thus, in every time period, a middleman either has
an item or does not have one. Hence, if there is a directed edge from node i to node j, a
specific agent of type i can only trade with an agent of type j if the type i agent has a copy
of the good and the type j agent does not; we refer to such a pair of agents as feasible trading
partners. Note that producers are assumed to always have a good available to trade and
consumers are always willing to purchase a good. So, for example, any two agents connected
by an edge in the set E1 are always feasible trading partners. For every edge (i, j) ∈ E , we
associate a non-negative transaction cost Cij ≥ 0; this cost is incurred when trade occurs
between an agent at node i and one at node j.
Next we discuss the bargaining process that determines the trading patterns for how
goods move through the network.
The Bargaining Process:
We consider an infinite horizon, discrete time repeated bargaining game, where agents dis-
count their payoff at rate 0 < δ < 19. Each period has multiple steps and is described as
follows.
7The analysis easily extends to a finite number of distinguishable goods.
8Again the analysis easily extends to allowing agents to hold a finite number of goods, albeit at the cost
of more notation and laborious book-keeping.
9The model can be extended to allow for heterogeneous discount rates.
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Step 1. One among all pairs of directly connected nodes (i, j) ∈ E is selected at random
with a predetermined probability distribution piij) on the set of edges E and one node from
each of the corresponding populations is selected uniformly at random. One of these agents
is further selected to be a proposer, again chosen at random10.
Step 2. If the agents are not feasible trading partners, then the game moves to the next
period and restarts at step 1. Recall that this will occur if neither agent has the good or if
both have the good.
Step 3. The proposer makes a take-it-or-leave it offer of a price at which he is willing
to trade. If the trading partner refuses, the game moves to the next period. Otherwise, the
two agents trade: one agent gives the item to and receives the money from the other, and
the proposer pays for the transaction cost Cij
11. If a consumer or producer participates in
a trade, they exit the game and are replaced by a clone. On the other hand, middlemen are
long lived and do not produce nor consume; they earn money by flipping the good.
Step 4. The game moves to the next period, which starts from Step 1.
The game is denoted by Γ(G, ~C, ~V , ~N, δ), where ~C denotes the vector of links costs, ~V
denotes the vector of consumer valuations and ~N denotes the vector of population sizes at
each node. Sometimes, we will simply refer to this game as Γ.
Remarks: We assume middlemen are long lived, on the other hand, producers and con-
sumers exit the game after trading. This captures an extreme contrast between different
type of agents: middlemen often stay in the market for a long period, while producers and
consumers have limited supply and demand for a certain good. The assumption that we
make about the replacement of producers and consumers capture a steady state of an ex-
tended economy, where there are incoming flows of producers and consumers at certain rates.
Here, to focus on the solution in a steady state, we assume these incoming rates are equal to
the rates at which these agents successfully trade. This can be made endogenous as in Gale
(1987). However, in a fully endogenous model, a characterization of equilibrium is difficult.
Here, we shortcut this problem by assuming the economy is already in a steady state.
In Steps 1 and 2, it is possible that trade is not possible between agents identified at
the ends of the chosen link. This leads to additional search friction as it results in a loss
of trading opportunity for these two agents. By appropriately choosing the distribution pi
and the choice of proposing agent when trade takes place, we can equivalently view the
dynamics from the perspective of the nodes such that the agents are picked independently
(following some distribution) to be proposers and depending on the state of the agent (i.e.,
10The model easily generalizes to allow for different but fixed probabilities of picking each end-point of a
link as the proposer of a trade.
11Actually, it does not matter who pays for this transaction cost, because, in equilibrium, the transaction
cost is reflected in the proposed price.
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if the agent possesses the good or not), one among the appropriate edges is chosen following
a distribution. Note that even from the node perspective, there is a possibility that the
proposing agent might pick an edge along which no trade is possible owing to the picked
agent having the same state as the proposing agent; once again, this leads to additional
search friction. We prefer to model the dynamics from the perspective of edges as it is more
general and fully subsumes the node perspective.
Since we are interested in analyzing the bargaining process defined earlier, as the number
of agents in each location increases without bound, we proceed to precisely define the effect
of increasing the population size.
Replicated Economy:
Given the bargaining game Γ(G, ~C, ~V , ~N, δ), the game’s kth replication is defined as a game
of the same structure except the population size is increased by a factor of k at each node,
and the time gap between consecutive periods is reduced by a factor of Tk. Formally, this is
defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 Given the game Γ(G, ~C, ~V , ~N, δ) and k, Tk ∈ N+, let δ′ = δ1/Tk . Then the
(k, Tk)-replication of Γ, denoted by Γ
k
Tk
(G, ~C, ~V , ~N, δ) is defined as Γ(G, ~C, ~V , k ~N, δ′).
Remark: The scaling of the discount rate δ in this definition is commonly used in the
study of dynamical systems. It is clear that without changing δ, in the replicated economy
each agent will need to wait for a longer and longer time to get selected, and thus his pay-off
approaches 0. If initially each period takes one unit of time, then note that changing the
discount rate to δ′ = δ1/Tk is mathematically equivalent to changing the time gap between
periods to become 1/Tk time units and keeping the discount rate fixed. Hence, for example,
if we choose Tk = c · k, it means we keep the rate that each agent sees trading opportunities
on the same order as in the original finite game. On the other hand Tk >> k models a
setting in which the rate at which agents trade is increasing. In this paper, for simplicity,
we will focus on the case Tk = k. Other choices of Tk do not affect our results, qualitatively.
3 Solution Concept And Existence Of Equilibrium
Next we turn to the solution concept considered in this paper, that we call a limit stationary
equilibrium. To define this equilibrium, we follow Nguyen (2012) and consider the limit
of finite agent games as the population increases. In particular, in each game with finite
population, we consider a semi-stationary equilibrium in which each agent believes that the
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economy is already in a steady state and behaves according to a stationary strategy profile.
This is certainly not enough. To “close the loop,” a limit stationary equilibrium is defined
as a limit of semi-stationary equilibria, whose dynamics converge to the presumed state.
To be more precise, we have the following definitions.
Definition 3.1 The state of the economy is a vector ~µ ∈ [0, 1]|M|, where µm denotes the
fraction of middlemen at node m that hold an item.
Definition 3.2 A strategy profile (possibly mixed strategy) is called a stationary strategy
if it only depends on an agent’s identity, his state (owning or not owning and item) and
the play of the game (which agent he is bargaining with, who the proposer is and what is
proposed). More precisely, suppose that agent i and agent j are selected to bargain, and
assume i owns an item, j does not, furthermore i is the proposer. In this case, a stationary
strategy of agent i is a distribution of proposed prices to agent j and a stationary strategy of
agent j is a probability of accepting the offer.
In the rest of the paper, given a stationary strategy, for each link (i, j) ∈ E we let λij
denote the conditional probability that i and j trade when they are matched and trade is
feasible, that is i owns an item and j does not.
In the following, we first start with the definition of a semi stationary equilibrium in a
finite economy, we then use this concept to define limit-stationary equilibria as the size of
the economy increases.
3.1 Semi-stationary equilibria
Informally, given a finite game and a state ~µ, a stationary strategy profile is a semi-stationary
equilibrium of the game with respect to ~µ, if under the hypothesis that agents believe the
state of the economy is always ~µ, no agent can strictly improve his payoffs by changing his
strategy12.
To define this concept more precisely, we need to introduce the expected pay-offs of
agent i depending on whether he possesses or does not possess a good, which we denote
by u0(i) and u1(i), respectively. Notice that because of the assumption that producers and
consumers exit the market after a successful trade, we have u0(p) = 0 for all p ∈ P and
12This stationary belief discounts the impact of certain strategic behaviors that will vanish owing to
competition between agents at each node as the population size increases, when determining the incentive
constraints. In particular, consider the case where there are exactly two consumers each of a different type
connected to a single middleman with one consumer being better than the other, both in terms of a higher
value for the good and a lower transaction cost. Then, the better consumer could refuse to trade unless he
gets a higher payoff by being offered the same price as the other consumer.
12
u1(c) = Vc for all c ∈ C. Furthermore, we assume that all agents believe that the state of the
economy is captured by ~µ. For the present, we will assume that ~µ is given. After deriving
the incentive conditions depending on ~µ, we will discuss the second type of conditions that
give ~µ endogenously.
The basic structure of the incentive constraints can be captured by the following argu-
ment. Assume two agents i and j meet, where i holds the good and j wants it. Also assume
that i is the proposer. If the trade is successfully completed, then j possesses the item, thus
agent i will demand from agent j the difference of the payoffs between the states before and
after the trade (discounted by δ). Note that the state of i also changes, and therefore, if
trade is successfully completed, then i’s payoff is
δu0(i) + δ
(
u1(j)− u0(j)
)− Cij.
However, agent i has the option of not proposing a trade (or proposing something that will
necessarily be rejected by the other party) and earn a payoff of δu1(i). Thus, in this situation,
the continuation payoff of agent i is
max{δu1(i), δu0(i) + δ
(
u1(j)− u0(j)
)− Cij}.
For ease of exposition define the difference between the two terms in this maximization
to be
zij := δ
(
u1(j)− u0(j)−
(
u1(i)− u0(i)
))− Cij. (1)
Thus, the continuation payoff of agent i when he is proposing to j is
δu1(i) + max{zij, 0}.
From this we also obtain the following conditions on the dynamics of trade:
1. If zij < 0, then agent i will never sell an item to agent j and will wait for a future
trade opportunity;
2. If zij > 0, then agent i will sell the item to agent j with probability one whenever they
are matched;13 and finally
13Note that when zij > 0 in equilibrium, it has to be the case that if agent i proposes to trade agent j will
agree to the trade. This is because if j only agrees with a probability 0 < p < 1, i can improve his payoff by
decreasing the proposing price by a small  > 0. However, for any such  > 0, i again has a better deviation
by decreasing the proposing price by a smaller amount, say /2.
13
3. If zij = 0, then agent i is indifferent between selling and waiting, thus, the trade can
occur with some probability λij ∈ [0, 1]. Conversely, if trade between agents i and j
occurs with probability 0 < λij < 1, then we must have zij = 0.
Similarly, assume now that instead of i, agent j is the proposer, then the continuation
payoff of j in this case is δu0(j) + max{zij, 0}. Furthermore, the same conditions concerning
the dynamic of trade between i and j, which depends on zij hold as above, but with the
roles of i and j interchanged.
These conditions can be delineated for the general network model introduced in the
previous section by considering each type of agent, the state of the agent in terms of holding
a good or not, and the probability that he is selected as a proposer. In our model, we have
three types of agents: producers, consumers and middlemen. Middlemen are active in the
game regardless of having or not having an item. Thus, we will need four types of equations
expressing the expected payoff of these agents given their states.
We consider these conditions in detail for the case of producers; the rest follows in similar
fashion using the logic outlined earlier. For each producer of type p ∈ P who has an item to
sell in each period, an agent p’s continuation payoff depends on which type of link is selected,
the pair of agents that are selected to trade, and whether p is selected as the proposer. Thus,
agent p’s expected continuation payoff is∑
c:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Np
(δu1(p) + max{zpc, 0}) +
∑
m:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Np
(1− µm)(δu1(p) + max{zpm, 0})+ (2)
+
(
1−
∑
c:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Np
−
∑
m:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Np
(1− µm)
)
δu1(p)
Here, zpc and zpm are defined as in (1). The first term of (2) represents the case where p
is the proposer to a consumer c. The second term represents p proposing to a middlemen
m, who currently does not own a good. Finally, the last term describes the case where p is
not a proposer. Here, recall that Np is the size of population at node p, and thus,
pipc
2Np
, is
the probability that the specific agent of type p is the proposer14 for a consumer c. On the
other hand, because only a fraction of middlemen are looking to buy, for every middlemen
node m ∈ M, pipm
2Np
(1 − µm) is the probability that p is matched with m, m does not hold
a good and p is the proposer. One can interpret this as a form of search friction, that is
the probability that a producer can find a trade-able middlemen depends on the state of the
economy, which, in turn, impacts the transaction dynamics between the producer and the
middleman.
14It is in this calculation that the generalization to different probabilities for the choice of a proposer can
be added.
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Now, because ~u are assumed to be values of a stationary equilibrium, u1(p) needs to
equal the expression in (2). After some algebraic manipulation, this is equivalent to
u1(p) =
∑
c:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Np(1− δ) max{zpc, 0}+
∑
m:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Np(1− δ)(1− µm) max{zpm, 0}. (3)
Similarly, for the two type of middlemen (either owning an item or not) and the con-
sumers, we have the following set of equations:
∀m ∈M u0(m) =
∑
p:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Nm(1− δ) max{zpm, 0}, (4)
∀m ∈M u1(m) =
∑
c:(m,c)∈E3
pimc
2Nm(1− δ) max{zmc, 0}, (5)
∀c ∈ C u0(c) =
∑
p:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Nc(1− δ) max{zpc, 0}+
∑
m:(m,c)∈E3
pimc
2Nc(1− δ)µm max{zmc, 0},
(6)
where zpm, zmc, zpc are defined as
zij = δ
(
u1(j)− u0(j)−
(
u1(i)− u0(i)
))− Cij ∀(i, j) ∈ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3. (7)
Once again, the state ~µ appears in the incentive equations above owing to the particular
search model that we consider. As mentioned earlier, since producer and consumers exit the
game after trading successfully, we have
∀p ∈ P u0(p) = 0, (8)
∀c ∈ C u1(c) = Vc. (9)
We are now ready to define a semi-stationary equilibrium.
Definition 3.3 Given a finite game Γ(G, ~C, ~V , ~N, δ) and a state ~µ, a stationary strategy
profile is a semi-stationary equilibrium with respect to ~µ if and only if there exists ~u, ~z sat-
isfying (3)-(9), and furthermore,
• If zij < 0, then irrespective of who the proposer is, agent i will never sell an item to
agent j, so that he will wait for a future trade opportunity;
• If zij > 0, then irrespective of who the proposer is, agent i will sell the item to agent j
with probability one whenever they are matched; and finally
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• If zij = 0, then proposer of the trade is indifferent between trading and waiting. Thus,
the trade occurs with some probability 0 ≤ λij ≤ 1. In addition, if trade between agents
i and j occurs with probability 0 < λij < 1, then zij = 0.
3.2 Limit stationary equilibrium
As the economy gets large, we need to consider the behavior of equations (3)-(9), where Ni
is replaced by kNi and δ is replaced by δ
1/k, as k increases without bound. Note that
lim
k→∞
k(1− δ1/k) = ln(1/δ) and lim
k→∞
δ1/k = 1.
Hence, in the limit, the set of equations (3)-(9) yield the following:
∀p ∈ P u0(p) = 0;
u1(p) =
∑
c:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Np ln(1/δ)
max{zpc, 0}+
∑
m:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Np ln(1/δ)
(1− µm) max{zpm, 0};
(10)
∀m ∈M u0(m) =
∑
p:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Nm ln(1/δ)
max{zpm, 0}; (11)
∀m ∈M u1(m) =
∑
c:(m,c)∈E3
pimc
2Nm ln(1/δ)
max{zmc, 0}; (12)
∀c ∈ C u0(c) =
∑
p:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Nc ln(1/δ)
max{zpc, 0}+
∑
m:(m,c)∈E3
pimc
2Nc ln(1/δ)
µm max{zmc, 0};
u1(c) = Vc; and
(13)
zij =
(
u1(j)− u0(j)−
(
u1(i)− u0(i)
))− Cij ∀(i, j) ∈ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3. (14)
Using these limiting equations, we now define our solution concept of limit stationary
equilibrium. Intuitively, a limit stationary equilibrium is a stationary strategy that can be
associated with ~u, ~z satisfying (10)-(14) in an similar way to the definition of semi-stationary
equilibrium. However, here another condition is added to guarantee that the dynamic given
by the stationary strategy will actually converge to the presumed state of the economy ~µ.
In particular, recall that a stationary strategy is given by a set of probabilities λij for every
edge (i, j) ∈ E , which denotes the probability of trade occurring among a pair of feasible
trading partners of type i and j. If λij = 1, trade always occurs and if λij = 0 it never
occurs. Given any such stationary strategy, the resulting dynamics can be modeled by a
Markov process, with the state space being the number of agents at each node holding a
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good. As the population at each node of the network increases, we want the limit of the
stationary distributions of these Markov process to be ~µ. We elaborate on the convergence
issue in much greater detail in Section 3.4.
More formally, we have the following definition for a limit stationary equilibrium.
Definition 3.4 Given a finite game Γ(G, ~C, ~V , ~N, δ) a stationary strategy profile is a limit
stationary equilibrium if the stationary distribution of the associated Markov process con-
verges to a point-mass15 on the state ~µ, and there exists ~u, ~z satisfying (10)-(14), moreover
• If zij < 0, then irrespective of who the proposer is, agent i will never sell an item to
agent j, so that he will wait for a future trade opportunity and λij = 0;
• If zij > 0, then irrespective of who the proposer is, agent i will sell the item to agent j
with probability one whenever they’re matched so that λij = 1; and finally
• If zij = 0, then proposer of the trade is indifferent between trading and waiting. Thus,
the trade occurs with some probability 0 ≤ λij ≤ 1. In addition, if trade between agents
i and j occurs with probability 0 < λij < 1, then zij = 0.
3.3 Existence of a Limit stationary equilibrium
We next show that a limit stationary equilibrium always exists.
THEOREM 3.5 For a bargaining game, Γ(G, ~C, ~V , ~N, δ), a limit stationary equilibrium
always exists.
Proof: Proof of Theorem 3.5: See Appendix 7.2.
The proof of this theorem is based on a standard fixed-point theorem argument for
the best-response correspondences of a fictitious game that is obtained from the incentive
constraints and the trading dynamic. The existence of limit stationary equilibria follows as
a consequence of the Markov dynamic resulting from our search model, a point that will be
elaborated on in the next section. We note, however, that the limit stationary equilibrium
might not be unique. In Section 4 we will give a method to compute and check if a stationary
strategy is a valid a limit stationary equilibrium.
15In a general mean-field analysis setting Sznitman (1991), the final object is typically a product measure
over the different types, instead of a point-mass as here. Then, the analysis of (10)-(14) would be carried
out by taking expectations over the corresponding product measure.
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3.4 Convergence of state of the trading process
As mentioned earlier, one of the key technical lemmas needed to prove the existence of a
limit equilibrium is to show that given any stationary strategy profile, the corresponding
Markov process in the replicated system will always converge to an unique state, which
is also a continuous function of the parameters. This, in return, allows us to define a
continuous mapping between two product state-payoff spaces, that can be used in a fixed
point argument. In this section, we discuss how to define the state of the trading process
and how to determine the ~µ used for defining both a semi-stationary equilibrium and a limit
stationary equilibrium. The formulation of the converging state given our particular Markov
process will allow us to compute and construct an equilibrium in various networks in the
next section16.
We will prove the existence of ~µ by analyzing the Markov process that drives the state
of the system, for a given set of stationary strategies {λij} for (i, j) ∈ E . Since the state of
middlemen can change with time, the entire system can be represented by a vector-valued
random process {Xkm(t) : m ∈ M}∞t=1 where for the kth replicated system we keep track of
the number of agents who have the item at each middleman type m ∈M. For mathematical
convenience, we will append {Xkp (t) : p ∈ P} where Xkp (t) ≡ kNp and {Xkc (t) : c ∈ C} where
Xkc (t) ≡ 0 for the states of the producers and the consumers, respectively. Since producers
exit the game as soon as they sell their good and are replaced by a clone with a good, at
any given time any producer always possesses a good. A similar reasoning holds for the
consumers never having a good.
For the kth replication, the state transitions are given as follows for each m ∈M
Xkm(t+ 1) =

min(kNm, X
k
m(t) + 1) w. p. ρ
k
m(+1)
max(0, Xkm(t)− 1) w. p. ρkm(−1)
Xkm(t) w. p. 1− ρkm(+1)− ρkm(−1),
where
ρkm(+1) =
(
1− X
k
m(t)
kNm
) ∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2
pipmλpm
is the probability that an agent of type m acquires a good in a given period, and
ρkm(−1) =
Xkm(t)
kNm
∑
c∈C:(m,c)∈E3
pimcλmc
16Readers who are familiar with Markov processes and their mean-field analysis may skip this part.
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is the probability that a type m agent sells a good in a given period. As noted above, the
states corresponding to producers in P and consumers in C are fixed for all time. This shows
that we have a Markov process, and it is easily verified that the process is irreducible.
Since the transition matrix of our Markov process satisfies Lipschitz conditions (see Ethier
and Kurtz (2005)), we can analyze the fluid limit that is obtained by scaling time and space,
i.e., by considering the process {X˜kv (t) : v ∈ V}, where
X˜kv (t) :=
Xkv (dkte)
k
, ∀v ∈ V ,
where dxe for real x is the smallest integer greater than x. We will analyze the behavior of
the scaled process {X˜kv (t) : v ∈ V}t∈R+ when k increases without bound. Note that this is
the exact scaling considered by the replicated systems discussed earlier. We then have the
following result.
Lemma 3.6 Given a set of probabilities for trade {λij, (i, j) ∈ E}, the stationary distribution
of the trading dynamic process described above converges to a point-mass on a unique state
~µ, which is the unique solution of∑
c∈C
pimcµm (1− µc)λmc =
∑
p∈P
pipmµp (1− µm)λpm ∀m ∈M, (15)
and which is given by
∀p ∈ P , µp = 1; ∀c ∈ C, µc = 0; (16)
∀m ∈M, µm =
∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm +
∑
c∈C:(m,c)∈E3 pimcλmc
. (17)
Proof: Proof of Lemma 3.6: See Appendix 7.1 for details.
For any fixed k, the Markov process {X˜kv (t) : v ∈ V} is irreducible and has finite-
states. Therefore, it has a unique stationary distribution. Note that Lemma 3.6 asserts that
these stationary distributions converge to a point-mass17 which is determined by stationary
behavior of the limiting process obtained as m increases with bound. In effect, the result
above justifies an exchange of the order of limits, k first and time later versus time first and
k later. It is both the convergence to a point-mass and this exchange of limits that justifies
our definition of semi-stationary equilibria and limit stationary equilibria.
From Lemma 3.6, µm for middlemen of type m is the stationary fraction of agents at
17As mentioned earlier, in a general mean-field analysis setting Sznitman (1991), the final object need not
be a point-mass but a product measure over the different types.
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node m ∈ M that hold the good. On the other hand, for the producers we have µp ≡ 1 for
all p ∈ P and the consumers we have µc ≡ 0 for all c ∈ C. The given values {µm : m ∈ M}
satisfy (15), which can be interpreted as a balance condition: for every node m ∈ M, in
every period, the probability that the amount of goods held at node m increases by one or
decreases by one should be equal. Looking at this interpretation of (15) more closely, each
term on the left-hand-side for a given c, pimcµm (1− µc)λmc is the probability that trade
occurs from m to c, which requires that link (m, c) is selected (with probability pimc), that
m and c are feasible trading partners (with probability µm(1 − µc) so that m has the good
and c needs it) and that trade occurs (with probability λmc). Similarly, each term on the
right-hand-side for a given p can be interpreted as the probability of trade from p to m.
While the use of {µp : p ∈ P} and {µc : c ∈ C} above is for mathematical convenience,
in more general networks (for future work) where we allow middlemen to trade with each
other, expressions similar to (15) will hold as the balance condition for every middlemen
type where the terms will involve the state of other middlemen as well.
4 Competion Among Middlemen
In this section, we focus on the equilibrium of our model for the network illustrated in
Figure 4. For simplicity, we assume all the transaction costs are 0 and each consumer’s
valuation of the good is 1. We will analyze the equilibrium as δ takes values between 0 and
1. Note that P = {1, 2}, M = {3, 4} and C = {5, 6}.
As discussed in the introduction, because producers at node 1 have access to more mid-
dlemen than at node 2, producers at 1 have better bargaining power than producers at 2.
Similarly, consumers at node 6 are in a better position than consumers at 5. However, a
comparison between the two middlemen position 3 and 4 is not straightforward. This is
because middlemen at node 3 have access to consumers at nodes 5 and 6, but only one
producer node 1, on the other hand middlemen at node 4 have access to more producers and
fewer consumers.
A precise prediction of the agents’ behaviors depends on the discount rate δ. The factor
by which agents discount their payoff if negotiation is not successful also fundamentally
influences the trade pattern. In particular, consider trade between 1 and 4. If producers
of type 1 sell to 4, then they might not be able to get as high a price as compared with
selling to middlemen of type 3, as they are faced with competition from 2. However, because
the opportunity to meet with potential trade partners come randomly, depending on the
discount rate, the producers might not have the incentive to wait for a trade opportunity
with 3. Hence, given the network in Figure 1, the pattern of trade depends on both the
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Figure 4: Transaction costs at every links are 0 and the value for all buyers for obtaining a
good is 1.
probability that the agents meet and their discount rate. To make the analysis simple, and
to focus on the impact of δ on the outcome of the market, we assume the population at every
node is the same, and the each pair is chosen uniformly at random. We will investigate how
changing δ would influence the trade pattern. In particular, we show that when δ is small,
an equilibrium strategy is for a pair of agents who can trade (that is one has an item to
sell, and the other doe not have an item), to trade with probability 1 whenever they meet.
However, as agents are more patient (δ is close to 1), then producers at node 1 never trade
with middlemen at node 4. This comparative analysis is summarized in Theorem 4.1.
Before getting to this result, for ease of presentation, we will introduce the following
notation18:
1
f(δ)
:=
piij
2Ni ln(1/δ)
.
Recall the set of Bellman equations (10)-(14) defining the concept of limit stationary equi-
librium where the right hand side of the above equations plays an important role in the
qualitative outcome of the game. In the following we will give some comparative analy-
sis based on f(δ). Notice that when δ → 1 , f(δ) approaches 0, and when δ → 0 , f(δ)
approaches ∞.
We call a stationary strategy an always trade strategy, if for every pair of agents that
are connected by a link of the network, trade occurs with probability 1, whenever they meet
and one agent has an item while the other does not have one. For a link (i, j), a stationary
strategy avoids trade on (i, j) if when i, and j meet, even though one agent has an item
to sell and the other does not have one, they do no trade and rather wait for a future
opportunity.
We summarize the comparative analysis studied in this section in the following result.
18Notice that here we assume all population sizes Ni are the same and the distribution of selecting an
edge piij is the uniform distribution, thus f(δ) does not depend on i, j.
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THEOREM 4.1 The following hold:
• If f(δ) = 1/2, then the “always trade” strategy is the unique pure equilibrium, in which
case the payoff of middlemen 3 is greater than that of middlemen 4.
• If f(δ) = 1/5, then the “always trade” strategy cannot be an equilibrium, and the
strategy that avoids trade on the link (1, 4) and always trades on all other links is the
unique pure equilibrium. At this equilibrium too, the payoff of middlemen 3 is greater
than that of middlemen 4
Remark: Notice that in both cases, payoff of middlemen of type 3 is greater than that
of middlemen of type 4. As discussed in the introduction, this result is in contrast with
models like Blume et al. (2009), where middlemen have all the power to set prices to both
producers and consumers simultaneously. In our model, the fact that middlemen need to
buy an item first before selling it has important consequences. In particular, middlemen 3
has an competitive advantage on the consumer’s side: it has access to more consumers than
middlemen 4. Thus, when holding a good, middlemen 3 can find a consumer easier than
4. This in return influences trade in the previous round between producers and middlemen.
Here even though 4 has access to more producers (1 and 2), the fact that after buying the
good from these producers middleman 4 is aware that he needs to compete and cannot get
as high a surplus as middleman 3, results in him not being able to offer as competitive a
price to the producers 1 and 2. In other words, in settings like ours, competition from the
consumers’ side is more important because it has an influence back to the competition on
the producers’ side.
Theorem 4.1 illustrates another interesting phenomenon about how the discount rate δ
influences the trade pattern. In particular, trade between 1 and 4 only occurs when agents
are impatient enough, that is f(δ) is large. The intuition is similar to the above argument.
The advantage of 3 over 4 in the consumers’ market influences 4’s ability to offer good prices
to the producers. Thus, when δ is close to 1, or equivalently f(δ) is small, a producer of
type 1 is better off waiting to trade exclusively with middlemen of type 3. In this case, the
advantage that 4 has over 3: being connected to both producers nodes disappears, because
trade between 1 and 4 will not occur. Clearly in this case, middlemen at node 3 are in a
better position than the middlemen at node 4.
Proof: Proof of Theorem 4.1: The main idea of constructing an equilibrium or showing
that a particular strategy is not an equilibrium is as follows.
First, given a strategy, and fixing an f(δ) value, we calculate the steady state of the
economy ~µ that the replicated Markov process converges to. This step can be calculated as
per Lemma 3.6. For example, for an “always trade” strategy, at node 4, the probability of
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selecting a link between producers and middlemen 4 is double the probability of selecting a
link between 4 and consumers. Thus, considering the “always-trade” strategy the balance
condition at node 4, we have that the rate of trading between 4 and 6 is equal to the total
of trading rate between 1 and 4, and 2 and 4. This implies that the fraction of middlemen
at node 4 that holds a good is twice the fraction of middlemen at node 4 that do not hold a
good. Hence, µ4 = 2/3. Similarly, µ3 = 1/3.
Second, based on the given strategy, assuming that it is an equilibrium, we obtain some
constraints on the variables zij = u1(j) − u0(j) − u1(i) + u0(i) − Cij. Specifically, in our
example, Cij = 0 and trade occurs with probability 1 on every link, thus z13, z14, z24, z35, z36
and z46 are all nonnegative. Based on the variables zij and ~µ, we can write the expected
payoff of agents i: u0(i) and u1(i) according to (10-13). For example in the “always-trade”
strategy, we have the following:
u0(1) = 0; u1(1) = f(δ)(
1
3
z14 +
2
3
z14)
u0(2) = 0; u1(2) = f(δ)
1
3
z24
u0(3) = f(δ)(z13); u1(3) = f(δ)(z35 + z36)
u0(4) = f(δ)(z14 + z24); u1(4) = f(δ)(z46)
u0(5) = f(δ)(
1
3
z35); u1(5) = 1
u0(6) = f(δ)(
1
3
z36 +
2
3
z46); u1(6) = 1.
Moreover, by definition, because z13, z14, z24, z35, z36 and z46 are nonnegative, we have
zij = u1(j)− u0(j)− u1(i) + u0(i)−Cij ∀(ij) ∈ E = {(1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 5), (3, 6), (4, 6)}.
Here, in our example, Cij = 0 for all links ij. With these we have a set of linear equations
for the variables zij.
The final step of the verification of an equilibrium is to solve the system of linear equations
in zij obtained in the previous step. Then, the given strategy is an equilibrium if and only if
• For a link (i, j), on which we assume trade occurs with probability 1, zij ≥ 0;
• For a link (i, j), on which we assume trade occurs with a probability λij ∈ (0, 1),
zij = 0; and
• For a link (i, j), on which we assume trade never occurs zij = u1(j)− u0(j)− u1(i) +
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u0(i)− Cij ≤ 0.
Following this method, one can prove Theorem 4.1 by numerically calculating the solu-
tion. In particular, with f(δ) = 0.5, under the “always trade” strategy, we have the following
solution, which shows that this strategy is an equilibrium:
z24 = 0.3141; z14 = 0.0024; z13 = 0.3895; z46 = 0.5782; z36 = 0.1911; z36 = 0.6537;
u0(1) = 0;u1(1) = 0.1302; u0(2) = 0;u1(2) = 0.0523;
u0(3) = 0.1948;u1(3) = 0.4224; u0(4) = 0.1582;u1(4) = 0.2891;
u0(5) = 0.1089;u1(5) = 1; u0(6) = 0.2246;u1(6) = 1.
This shows that the payoff of middlemen 3 is better than that of 4, in both states (having
an item and not having an item). In fact this comparative result holds robustly, below we
compute the payoff of middlemen 3 and 4 for f(δ) ranging from .5 to 5, see Figure 5.
Figure 5: The payoffs of the middlemen are plotted as a function of δ; note that f(δ)
approaches 0 as δ approaches 1 and infinity as δ approaches 0.
On the other hand, when f(δ) < 0.49, when using the “always-trade” strategy we will
obtain a solution in which z14 is negative. For example, when f(δ) = 0.2, z14 = −0.1403,
which shows that the “always trade” strategy cannot be an equilibrium for this case. Recall
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here that z14 = u1(4)− u0(4)− u1(1) + u0(1), which is the gain in trade when 1 sell an item
to 4. If this value is negative, then 1 and 4 do not trade.
However, with f(δ) = 0.2, consider the strategy that avoids trade on the link (1, 4) and
always trades otherwise. We will show that this is an equilibrium. To see this, first we
observe that in this case the unique steady state of the Markov dynamic is µ3 = 1/3 and
µ4 = 1/2. Similar to the previous case, we can set up a linear equation system for zij, where
(ij) ∈ E = {(1, 3), (2, 4), (3, 5), (3, 6), (4, 6)}. Solving the system of linear equations, we get
z24 = 0.5054, z13 = 0.5755, z46 = 0.8592, z36 = 0.1344, z35 = 0.9399.
Note that these values are all positive. Furthermore, the gain in trade between 1 and 4 is
u1(4)− u0(4)− u1(1) + u0(1) = f(δ)
(
z46 − z24 − 2
3
z13 + 0
)
= −0.0299 · f(δ) < 0.
This shows that, indeed, 1 and 4 do not have an incentive to trade. It is also clear here that,
in this case, middlemen of type 3 have a higher payoff than middlemen of type 4.
Lastly, by considering all other pure strategies, we can conclude that for f(δ) = 0.5 the
“always trade” strategy, and for f(δ) = 0.2 “avoiding trade on the link (1, 4) and always
trades on all other links” are the unique pure equilibrium, respectively.
5 Comparative Studies With Patient Agents
In this section we will focus our comparative studies on the case when the discount factor δ
approaches 1, which we sometimes refer to as when “agents are being patient” or the case
of “vanishing bargaining friction.” In many cases, by considering this limiting case, we are
either able to give a closed form characterization of the equilibrium, or present robust and
general properties of any equilibrium.
We start by showing that as agents become patient, they will choose the cheapest trading
routes (i.e. the routes with the smallest transaction costs) and intermediary fees per trans-
action will approach 0. We then give a closed form characterization for the equilibrium in
a simple network containing two links. This shows how endogenous delay emerges even in
this simple network. Finally, we use these two results to give an example of how changing
the transaction costs in a network can have a fundamental and counter intuitive impact on
agents’ payoffs.
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5.1 Preference for Cheapest Trade Routes
THEOREM 5.1 Given a producer p, a consumer c, and any  > 0, there exists δ∗, such
that for all δ > δ∗ and at any equilibrium the following is true. If λpm > 0 and λmc > 0 for
a middlemen m, that is trade occurs along the route p → m → c, then the cost Cpm + Cmc
is the smallest among all trading routes between p and c. Furthermore, the total surplus of
producer p and consumer c satisfies u1(p) + u0(c) ≥ Vv − (Cpm + Cmc)− .
Proof: Proof of Theorem 5.1: See Appendix 7.3.
Remark: The above result demonstrates a global-level efficiency that emerges in the
equilibria of the local non-cooperative bargaining scheme if agents are patient enough: edges
that are not along a cheapest path from any producer and consumer pair are never used,
and middlemen who have no edges along a cheapest path from any producer and consumer
pair see no trade.
Furthermore, u1(p)+u0(c) ≥ Vv−(Cpm+Cmc)− implies that the total surplus of producer
p and consumer c is almost the entire trade surplus on the path p → m → c. This implies
that as δ approaches 1, the intermediary’s fee that j charges approaches 0. We discussed
the intuition for this property in the introduction (Section 1). One important feature of our
model that leads to this result is the fact that middlemen are long-lived and do not consume
the good, while producers and consumer have limited supply and demand. Middlemen are
eager to buy and sell quickly, while producers and consumers can wait because the discount
rate δ is close to 1. It can be seen mathematically in the proof that when δ approaches 1,
zpm and zpc approach 0. The term zpm + zmc captures the gain of surplus for middlemen
m after buying an item from p and selling it to c, assuming in both transactions, m is the
proposer.
Figure 6: The trading network used to explore the choice of trade routes for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Also notice that the selection of the cheapest routes does not hold when agents discount
their payoff by δ much smaller than 1. To see this consider the network illustrated in Figure 6,
where there are two paths connecting producer 1 and consumer 2. The direct link has a cost
of 1/2, and both links connecting to middleman 3 costs 0. Hence, from Theorem 5.1, when
δ is large enough trade will only occur through the middleman. However, when δ is small
enough, even though the surplus of the direct trade is 1 − 1/2 = 1/2, trade will happen on
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link (1, 2) when it is selected instead of waiting to trade through the middlemen of type 3. In
particular, assume the population at each node is the same, say N , and each link is selected
uniformly at random so that piij = 1/3 for all (i, j).
Similar to the computation used in Theorem 4.1, let
1
f(δ)
:=
piij
2N ln(1/δ)
=
1
6N ln(1/δ)
.
It is then straightforward to check that the following is a limit stationary equilibrium.
• “Always trade” if f(δ) ≥ 1/2;
• Always trade on (1, 3), (3, 2) and avoid trade on (1, 2), if f(δ) < 1/2, which corresponds
to δ ≥ exp (− 1
3N
)
.
In Figure 7, we plot the payoff of 1, 2, and 3 at this equilibrium as f(δ) varies from 0 to 2;
these are decreasing as f(δ) increases.
Figure 7: Agent payoffs as a function of f(δ).
5.2 Endogenous Delay
We now consider a simple network that consists of two links illustrated in Figure 8, which
was again discussed in the introduction (Section 1). This network represents the simplest
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example where producers and consumers cannot trade directly. We fully characterize the
limit stationary equilibrium in this example, which will be shown to be unique. Even in
this simple network, we observe an interesting phenomenon of endogenous delay as part
of the equilibrium. This is counterintuitive since in a full information dynamic bargaining
model like ours, delay in trade does not enable agents to learn any new information, but only
decreases the total surplus of trade. Therefore, the network structure and the combination of
incentives of long-lived and short-lived agents are the main sources causing this inefficiency
in bargaining.
Figure 8: A simple network to illustrate endogenous delay.
Assume a and b are transaction costs of the first and second link, also let V be the
value of the consumption of the good; without loss of generality, we will insist that trade
is favorable so that V > a + b. The probabilities of using the links are then pi12 and pi23.
We assume the population sizes at every node is equal, and without loss of generality, we
assume19 N1 = N2 = N3 = 1. We will show that in this simple network, the stationary
equilibrium is unique, and we characterize the condition under which agents do not trade
immediately.
THEOREM 5.2 In the limit of δ → 1, that is, when the agents are patient, there is always
a unique limit stationary equilibrium. Furthermore, if V ≥
(
1 + pi12
pi12+pi23
)
a + b =: V¯ , then
trade always happens, otherwise there is a delay. The probability of trade on link (1, 2), λ12,
the probability of trade on link (2, 3), λ23, and the equilibrium state and the payoffs of the
19Following the proof of this result, it will become clear that this assumption does not result in any loss
of generality when agents are patient.
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middleman are given by
λ23 = 1, λ12 =
1 if V ≥ V¯pi23(V−b−a)
pi12(2a+b−V ) otherwise
,
µ2 =
 pi12pi12+pi23 if V ≥ V¯V−b−a
a
otherwise
,
u1(2) =

(V−b)
(
2− pi12
pi12+pi23
)
−a
1+
pi12pi23
(pi12+pi23)
2
if V ≥ V¯
a otherwise
, u0(2) =

V−
(
1+
pi12
pi12+pi23
)
a−b
1+
pi12pi23
(pi12+pi23)
2
if V ≥ V¯
0 otherwise
,
u0(3) =

(V−b)
(
2− pi12
pi12+pi23
)
−a
pi12+pi23
pi12
+
pi23
pi12+pi23
if V ≥ V¯
1− b− a otherwise
, u1(1) =

V−
(
1+
pi12
pi12+pi23
)
a−b
pi12+pi23
pi12
+
pi23
pi12+pi23
if V ≥ V¯
0 otherwise.
Remark: As discussed in the introduction (Section 1), this can be compared with a model
where each node consists of a single agent, where the sunk cost problem causes market
failure, and no trade is the unique equilibrium. Here, however, we show that when the stock
at the middlemen node is small, the search friction for a consumer to find a middlemen that
owns an item increases the middlemen’s bargaining power, and this reestablishes trade with
a positive probability.
From Theorem 5.2, we also see that trade always occurs on link (2, 3) but can be delayed
at link (1, 2). Since the consumer is at the other end of link (2, 3), it stands to reason that
there is no delay in the trade. However, at link (1, 2), any sale of the item results in a
decreased likelihood of the trade at the same link (in the near future) owing to the search
mechanism, and this opportunity cost introduces the delay in trade. Note also that with a
delay in trade, the producer obtains no surplus! We will revisit this effect in the next section
when we discuss the impact of the delay on the share of the surplus between the agents.
Trade gets delayed when the value of the good is below a specific threshold. From the
proof one can discern that the additional penalty term in the threshold is the product of the
transaction cost at link (1, 2) and the stationary probability that the middleman possesses
the good.
Proof: Proof of Theorem 5.2: See Appendix 7.4.
5.3 Share Of Surplus
Lastly, we consider the imbalance between the surplus of producers and consumers as a result
of our decentralized trade model.
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Figure 9: Triangle network with transaction costs.
Consider the following (also simple) network, where node 1 represents producers, node
2 represent consumers and node 3 represents middlemen, as illustrated in Figure 9. Again
without loss of generality, we assume thatN1 = N2 = N3 = 1. We also assume that in our
bargaining model, every link is selected uniformly at random, that is piij = 1/3 for all i 6= j.
Assume the consumer’s valuation for the good is V2 = 4, and the transaction costs are the
following: C12 = 3, C32 = 0 and C13 = 4 − x. We will investigate the equilibrium as x
changes. As x increases, the transaction cost between 1 and 3 decreases, making the total
trade surplus max{4− 3, 4− (4− x)} = max{1, x} increase.
The surplus of producers in this example is understood as the payoff of agents at node 1
when owning an item: u1(1). On the other hand, the surplus of consumers in this example
is the payoff of agents at node 2 when not owning an item: u0(2). According to the analysis
in Section 5.1, as the discount rate δ approaches 1, trade will only goes through the cheapest
route. Let C¯ be the cost of this route, as seen in Section 5.1 we also have
lim
δ→1
u1(2)− u0(2)− (u1(1)− u0(1)) = C¯.
This is equivalent to
lim
δ→1
u0(2) + u1(1) = V2 − C¯.
As shown in Section 5.1 this means that the total surplus of a producer and a consumer
approaches the total trading surplus, and for every transaction, middlemen only make a
vanishing amount of fee. As discussed in the introduction, this is because in our model, we
assume producers and consumers are short-lived, while middlemen are long-lived and has to
earn money by flipping the item. Thus, as δ approaches 1, while producers and consumers
are patient, middlemen are eager to buy and sell quickly.
Now, in the example above, when considering the equilibrium payoff as δ approaches 1,
we have if x < 1 that producers and consumers will trade directly, and in this case producers
and consumers equally share the surplus, giving them a surplus of 4−3
2
= 1
2
.
On the other hand, if x > 1, then direct trade between producers and consumers is too
expensive, and trade will go through middlemen at node 3. In the latter case, we will use
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the analysis in Section 5.2 to compute the equilibrium payoff, and we have
1. 1 < x < 4/3: Seller’s surplus, u1(1) = 0 and consumer’s surplus u0(2) = x, so that the
consumers get all the trade surplus;
2. 4/3 ≤ x ≤ 4: Seller’s surplus, u1(1) = 4−3/2(4−x)5/2 = 3x−45 and consumer’s surplus
u0(2) =
2x+4
5
.
This is illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Surplus of producer and consumers as x increases from 0 to 4
Even in this simple network, we observe quite an interesting phenomenon: there is a
discontinuous shift in the trading pattern occurring in the network. If x increases from 1 to
4/3, so that the transaction cost between 1 and 3, C13 = 4 − x, decreases, then the total
surplus between producers and consumers increases, but producers are actually worse off
because of this shift in the market structure. This also highlights how local adjustments by
the producers could leave them in a worse-off position. Note that when x = 1, at least two
limit stationary exist: trade directly or via middlemen.
This example captures an interesting and counterintuitive phenomenon: as the transac-
tion cost towards middlemen decreases, producers can be worse off, because the high cost
of direct trading makes consumers refuse to trade directly and prefer to trade through mid-
dlemen. For example, in many supply chain networks, as these global networks get large,
producers and consumers do not trade directly and several types of organizations emerge as
middlemen. In many cases such as in coffee industry, producers (coffee farmers) obtain a
very small fraction of surplus because there are too many middlemen in the supply chain
network. See for example Bacon (2005) for a related empirical analysis of the coffee global
supply chain and the recent shift in its market structure.
31
6 Conclusions And Future Work
In this paper we considered non-cooperative local bargaining over a trading network with
a single type of good. In the limiting scenario of many agents, we showed the existence of
a limit stationary equilibrium that can be characterized by a combination of the stationary
probability of a trade happening on each link, the stationary distribution of the agents’
possessing the good, and the stationary payoffs of the agents. We then showed that when
agents are patient enough, this limiting equilibrium can exhibit global efficiency. We applied
this concept to several simple network structures to study the impact of the network on the
bargaining power and surplus of all agents. In future work we plan to extend the results
to more general networks, to include the analysis of losing or damaging the good and to
rigorously connect the equilibria in the finite-player game to the limit stationary equilibria.
7 APPENDIX
7.1 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Since the transition matrix of the Markov process {X˜kv (t) : v ∈ V} satisfies a Lipschitz
condition, by an application of Kurtz’s Theorem (Ethier and Kurtz 2005, Th. 2.1, Chapter
11), we obtain a differential equation for the limiting process. The globally asymptotically
stable state of the differential equation is a continuous function from the non-negative reals
to
∏
p∈P [0, Np] ×
∏
m∈M[0, Nm] ×
∏
c∈C[0, Nc]. The limiting processes
20 are given as follows
for all t ≥ 0,
∀p ∈ P , xp(t) ≡ Np; ∀c ∈ C, xc(t) ≡ 0;
∀m ∈M, dxm(t)
dt
=
(
1− xm(t)
Nm
) ∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2
pipmλpm − xm(t)
Nm
∑
c∈C:(m,c)∈E3
pimcλmc (18)
=
∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2
pipmλpm − xm(t)
Nm
 ∑
p∈P:(p.m)∈E2
pipmλpm +
∑
c∈C:(m,c)∈E3
pimcλmc
 . (19)
Using a quadratic Lyapunov function (square of the distance to the equilibrium point) it
follows21 that there is a unique and globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point that is
20Even though Kurtz’s Theorem applies only for finite time-horizons, the compact setting of the scaled
processes and the well-behaved nature of the differential equation above allow us to analyze the convergence
of the stationary solutions as well.
21The details are omitted as this is a standard technique for the linear dynamics in (19).
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given by
∀p ∈ P , x∗p = Np; ∀c ∈ C, x∗c = 0;
∀m ∈M, x∗m = Nm
∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm +
∑
c∈C:(m,c)∈E3 pimcλmc
.
Therefore, the fraction of agents with the good satisfies
∀p ∈ P , µp = 1; ∀c ∈ C, µc = 0;
∀m ∈M, µm =
∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm +
∑
c∈C:(m,c)∈E3 pimcλmc
.
Note that setting the right-hand side of (18) to zero, yields the balance condition (15).
For each k, it is easy to see that the Markov process is irreducible and has finite states,
and so is positive recurrent. Thus, owing to the compact setting, the stationary measures of
the scaled state processes converge to the point mass on the equilibrium point as k increases
without bound, see Benaim and Boudec (2011).
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.5
We need to show that there exists (~λ, ~µ, ~u, ~z) satisfying the following conditions:
1. Convergence: given the trading dynamics defined by ~λ, the replicated economy con-
verges to the steady state ~µ. According to Lemma 3.6, the convergence occurs and the
dependence of ~µ on ~λ is given by (16)-(17);
2. Payoff-state consistency: ~u and ~z need to satisfy equations (10)-(14); and
3. Payoff-dynamic consistency: if zij > 0 then λij = 1; if zij < 0 then λij = 0; and if
zij = 0, then 0 ≤ λij ≤ 1.
Given (~λ, ~µ, ~u), using equations (10)-(14) and (16)-(17) as well as the payoff-dynamic
consistency above, we can obtain the following correspondence (~Λ, ~µ′, ~u′), which we can
write as follows,
F (~λ, ~µ, ~u) = (~Λ, ~µ′, ~u′),
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where
∀p ∈ P µ′p = 1,
∀c ∈ C µ′c = 0,
∀m ∈M µ′m =
∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm∑
p∈P:(p,m)∈E2 pipmλpm +
∑
c∈C:(m,c)∈E3 pimcλmc
,
and for all (i, j) ∈ E
Λij ={1} if u1(j)− u0(j)− (u1(i)− u0(i))− Cij > 0,
Λij ={0} if u1(j)− u0(j)− (u1(i)− u0(i))− Cij < 0,
Λij =[0, 1] if u1(j)− u0(j)− (u1(i)− u0(i))− Cij = 0.
Furthermore,
∀p ∈ P u′0(p) = 0,
u′1(p) =
∑
c:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Np ln(1/δ)
max{zpc, 0}+
∑
m:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Np ln(1/δ)
(1− µm) max{zpm, 0},
∀m ∈M u′0(m) =
∑
p:(p,m)∈E2
pipm
2Nm ln(1/δ)
max{zpm, 0},
∀m ∈M u′1(m) =
∑
c:(m,c)∈E3
pimc
2Nm ln(1/δ)
max{zmc, 0},
∀c ∈ C u′0(c) =
∑
p:(p,c)∈E1
pipc
2Nc ln(1/δ)
max{zpc, 0}+
∑
m:(m,c)∈E3
pimc
2Nc ln(1/δ)
µm max{zmc, 0},
u′1(c) = Vc, where
zij =
(
u1(j)− u0(j)−
(
u1(i)− u0(i)
))− Cij ∀(i, j) ∈ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3.
It is straightforward to check that the function F (·, ·, ·) above satisfies all the requirements
for Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem. The domain is a non-empty, compact and convex subset
of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. The mapping/correspondence has a closed-graph:
since the mappings from ~λ to ~µ′ and ~µ to ~u′ are single-valued and continuous, we only need
to satisfy this for the mapping from ~u to ~Λ. For any sequence (~un, ~Λn) (in the domain) such
limn→∞(~un, ~Λn) = (~u, ~Λ), it is easy to see that ~Λ must lie in the image of ~u. Finally, the
image of any point in the domain is non-empty, closed and convex. Therefore, there must
be a fixed-point, and furthermore, by definition, any fixed point of this mapping is a limit
stationary equilibrium.
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7.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Consider equations (10), (11), (12) and (13). As δ approaches 1, the log(1/δ) term approaches
0. Since u1(p) ∈ [0,maxc∈C Vc] for all i ∈ P , and u0(c) ∈ [0,maxc∈C Vc] for all c ∈ C, it has to
be that given any  > 0, there exists δ∗ such that for all δ > δ∗, we have
zpc ≤  ∀(p, c) ∈ E1,
zpm ≤  ∀(p,m) ∈ E2,
zmc ≤  ∀(m, c) ∈ E3.
Now consider a pair of agents, one producer p and consumer c. We have three cases then:
1. All trade routes from p to c have to visit some middleman. Let m ∈ M be one such
middleman so that (p,m) ∈ E2 and (m, c) ∈ E3. The inequalities above then imply the
following:
u1(m)− u0(m) ≥ u1(c)− u0(c)− Cmc − ,
u1(m)− u0(m) ≤ u1(p)− u0(p) + Cpm + .
These with u0(p) = 0 and u1(c) = Vc imply
u1(p) + u0(c) ≥ Vc − Cpm − Cmc − 2.
Note that this inequality holds for every m ∈ M that lies along a trade route from p
to c. Therefore,
u1(p) + u0(c) ≥ Vc − min{m:(p,m)∈E2 and (m,c)∈E3}
(
Cpm + Cmc
)
− 2.
Since  can be chosen arbitrarily small, thus for any middleman m who is not on a
smallest transaction cost path from p to c, we can choose δ close enough to 1 such that
either zpm or zmc is strictly negative and so no trade can occur on the corresponding
edge;
2. Notice that the same argument also works for the case, where if in addition to the
middlemen, there also exists a direct link between p and c. Then
u1(p) + u0(c) ≥ Vc −min
(
Cpc, min{m:(p,m)∈E2 and (m,c)∈E3}
(
Cpm + Cmc
))
.
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Again it is clear that no trade occurs over links that are not part of a smallest trans-
action cost path from p to c;
3. If p and c only have a direct route between them, then that is the only route via which
trade can occur between this producer and consumer pair. Also, if no routes exist
between p and c, then obviously no trade occurs between these two agents.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 5.2
The equilibrium equations for this case are as follows:
u1(1) =
pi12
2 ln(1/δ)
(1− µ2) max{z12, 0}, u0(2) = pi12
2 ln(1/δ)
max{z12, 0},
u1(2) =
pi23
2 ln(1/δ)
max{z23, 0}, u0(3) = pi23
2 ln(1/δ)
µ2 max{z23, 0},
z12 = (u1(2)− u0(2)− u1(1))− a, z23 = (V − u0(3)− u1(2) + u0(2))− b,
λ12 ∈

{1} z12 > 0
{0} z12 < 0
[0, 1] z12 = 0
, λ23 ∈

{1} z23 > 0
{0} z23 < 0
[0, 1] z23 = 0
, µ2 =
pi12λ12
pi12λ12 + pi23λ23
.
From the above is clear that u1(1) = (1− µ2)u0(2) and u0(3) = µ2u1(2). Substituting these
we get
z12 =
(
u1(2)− (2− µ2)u0(2)
)− a, z23 = (V − (1 + µ2)u1(2) + u0(2))− b.
First consider the assumption that trade occurs with probability one on both links, i.e.,
λ12 = λ23 = 1. This then implies that µ2 =
pi12
pi12+pi23
, z12, z23 ≥ 0 and we can substitute them
directly into the equations for the payoffs. We then obtain the following linear equations in
u0(2) and u1(2),
u0(2) =
u1(2)− a
2 ln(1/δ)
pi12
+ (2− µ2)
, u1(2) =
u0(2) + V − b
2 ln(1/δ)
pi23
+ (1 + µ2)
.
We can take limits in the equations above as δ goes to 1 (along an appropriate subsequence)
to get
u0(2)(2− µ2) = u1(2)− a, u1(2)(1 + µ2) = u0(2) + V − b.
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Since the ln(1/δ) terms vanish in the limit of δ going to 1, so would the impact of the different
population sizes. The unique solution of the above system of linear equations is
u1(2) =
(2− µ2)(V − b)− a
1 + µ2 − µ22
, u0(2) =
V − (1 + µ2)a− b
1 + µ2 − µ22
. (20)
It is easily seen that u1(2) ≥ 0 and u0(2) ≥ 0 if and only if V ≥ (1 + µ2)a − b = V¯ , and at
the equilibrium z12 = z23 = 0.
For the remainder assume that V < V¯ . Consider the case that λ23 = 1 and 0 < λ12 < 1.
This then implies that z12 = 0, z23 ≥ 0 and µ2 = pi12λ12pi12λ12+pi23 . Again taking a limit of δ going
to 1 (along an appropriate subsequence), we also get z23 = 0. If we solve (20), then the
calculated u0(2) will be negative which then implies that at the equilibrium u0(2) = 0; note
that z12 = 0 for δ < 1 also yields the same conclusion. Now it follows that
u1(2) = a, µ2 =
V − b− a
a
, and λ12 =
pi23(V − b− a)
pi12(2a+ b− V ) ∈ (0, 1).
Since V < V¯ =
(
1 + pi12
pi12+pi23
)
a + b, it also follows that V < 2a + b which ensures µ2 ≤ 1.
Similarly, one can verify that λ12 ∈ (0, 1). Since the consistency conditions are met, we have
an equilibrium.
The uniqueness of the solution in both cases also proves that the same solution holds
along every subsequence of δ converging to 1 (from below) so that the uniqueness of the
equilibrium also follows. Finally, we can verify that there can be no other equilibria.
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